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Publicly Traded Justice
Samuel Ludington
Abstract
Private prisons, like hotels, are most profitable when they are at
maximum occupancy and their guests stay for longer periods of
time. Because the business-model for private prisons is predicated
on incarceration rates dictated by public policy, one would
presume that private prison corporations expend great resources
to advocating for stricter criminal laws and sentencing. This note
explores the role of political lobbying and campaign contributions
of private prison corporations to see if a correlative relationship
exists between their advocacy and stricter crime laws. Part I of
the note provides a history of private prisons in America and
explores the laws which lead to the explosive growth in prison
populations. Part II will provide an overview of the three largest
providers of private prisons and analyzes their political
contributions. Part III discusses other business development
strategies employed by private prison operators, outside of
traditional political lobbying schema. Part IV discusses the
present threat to private prison organizations and concludes that
public outrage with the capitalization of incarceration, poses an
existential threat to private prisons. While private prisons have
expended significant resources in political lobbying, the greatest
dividends were attributable to their involvement in the American
Legislative Exchange Council, which allowed private prisons to
draft legislation that produced demand for their services.
Nevertheless, these legislative victories are unlikely to withstand
the threat posed by widespread public frustration, which has
   
           
sustain their operations.
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PART I: OVERVIEW
A. Supply and demand economic theory
A fundamental theory in economics is, holding all else equal in a
competitive market, the unit price of a good is a function of the quantity
supplied and the quantity demanded for set good. The greater the demand
for a good in limited supply, the higher the unit price. Conversely, surplus
supply of an item in limited demand results in a lower unit cost. This
theory of supply and demand has served as the foundation for economic
theory since its postulation, and economist have used it to explain
fluctuations in the market price for goods ranging from grocery items to
global oil prices. However, do theories of supply and demand govern when
the quantity demanded is a function of government policy and the traded
commodity is incarceration?1 Do private prison corporations, who
contribute to the supply side of incarceration by virtue of prison capacities,
1
See Kenneth L. Avio, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model
Contract and Model Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 265, 279 (1991).



2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

95

have a perverse incentive to advocate for longer prison sentences and
stricter parole laws to increase demand for their product?2
                
market, a profitable prison corporation must either trim inefficiencies,
increase inmate numbers or do both . . . .the privatized prison industry has
incentives to increase incarceration rates, the lengths of sentences, . . . all
         3 Private prison corporations have been
likened to the hotel          
strong economic incentive to book every available room and encourage
            4 This note will investigate the
         !    argest private prison
corporations, both at the federal and state level, to explore whether a
corollary relationship exists between their activities and sentencing
policies that increase demand for prison capacity.
To begin, the note will provide a brief overview of the private prison
industry and explain the social and political factors that contributed to its
increased prominence in the criminal justice system. Secondly, the note
will provide an overview of the three largest private prison operators,
analyzing their individual political lobbying expenditures and their
corporate policies governing their political lobbying. Part III will discuss
the role of the American Legislative Exchange Council in the explosive
growth of the prison population and will argue that membership in this
council, more than traditional lobbying and other nefarious methods of
increasing demand, was the primary contributor for the increased
utilization of private prisons. In Part IV, the note will explore recent threats
to the long-term business viability of private prison corporations and will
argue that increased public scrutiny poses an existential threat to the
privatization of prisons. The note concludes that despite its legislative
victories which were the basis for mass incarceration and as a result,
increased demand for its product, private prison corporations are ill   !     
justice.

B. History of private prisons in the United States
Though thought to be a modern novelty in response to increased
expenditures on prisons, the commoditization of incarceration began as

2

See id.
See Matthew Mulch, Crime and Punishment in Private Prisons, 66 NAT!L LAW GUILD
REV. 70, 71 (2009).
4
Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at
51, 64.
3
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early as the 18th century.5 Government officials appointed a head jailer for
a particular jurisdiction who would frequently sell the labor of his inmates,
or accept payment for preferential treatment.6 Following the Civil War,
prison populations in southern states increased dramatically, leading
prison administrators to outsource inmate labor in a practice known as

   7 The practice became so widespread after the Civil War
that every Southern state, except for Virginia, adopted inmate leasing
relationships with private individuals or firms.8 Not surprisingly, an
overwhelming majority of the inmates in the South were Black, and served
disproportionately long sentences.9
It was market forces, rather than the moral abhorrence of inmate
leasing systems, that led to the diminished popularity of such programs
towards the end of the 19th century.10 Government officials, realizing the
tremendous costs of basic inmate provisions and operational costs of
maintaining prisons, determined that the programs led to diminishing
returns.11 Furthermore, competing industries and organized labor decried
the competitive advantage gained by the minimal labor costs available
through convict leasing.12 At the Federal level, President Theodore
Roosevelt signed an executive order prohibiting the use of convict labor
on federal projects in 1905, followed by the Hawes-Cooper Convict Labor
Act of 1929, allowing states to prohibit the interstate importation of goods
manufactured by inmates.13 As the practice of convict leasing in state run
institutions became less prevalent, operational and administrative
management of correctional institutions became a function of the
government, save for a few ancillary services which remained privatized.14
The first resurgence of privatized prisons was in the 1974, when
Congress passed the Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act aimed at
preventing juvenile delinquency through alternative programming and
decrease reliance on traditional forms of incarceration.15 The landmark
5

See James Austin & Garry Coventry, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 19
(Bureau
Just.
Assistance,
NCJ
181249,
2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf.
6
Id. at 9.
7
See Mulch, supra note 3, at 71
8
See Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison
in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 127 (2001).
9
See Mulch, supra note 3, at 72.
10
See id.
11
See Austin & Coventry, supra note 5, at 11.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
See Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat.
1109.
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legislation established federal standards for the treatment of juvenile
offenders and also provided financial inducements for state compliance.16
There were two principle goals of the legislation: (1) to end the practice of
housing juvenile offenders in adult jails and prisons, and (2) to find
alternative methods of rehabilitating juveniles.17 The financial
inducements coupled with the demand for innovative approaches to
incarceration, created an incentive for the private sector to explore ways
to capitalize the criminal justice sector.18
As a result, large corporations with no expertise in criminal justice and
juvenile rehabilitative services, but recognizing the opportunity for
lucrative government contracts, began operating juvenile correctional
facilities. Two years after its passage, RCA Services, a division of Radio
Corporation of America began operating Weaverville Intensive Treatment
Unit in North Hampton, Pennsylvania, a juvenile center for serious
offenders.19 Shortly thereafter, the Eckerd Corporation, a drug
manufacturer and drug store chain, assumed control of the Okeechobee
School for Boys in Florida.20 In 1984, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
signed a three-year contract with Eclectic Communications, Inc., to house
sixty 18 to 26-year-old offenders at Hidden Valley Ranch in California.21
The Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act sought to improve juvenile
outcomes by incentivizing innovative approaches to juvenile justice, and
in doing so, transformed the entire criminal justice system by revealing its
profitability.
Contemporaneously, state correctional institutions began contracting
with private prison corporations. The Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA) was contracted to manage the Hamilton County jail in Tennessee,
and subsequently in 1985 was contracted to manage the complete
            22 The first privately owned and
operated facility opened in 1985, when United States Corrections
Corporation opened Marion Adjustment Center in Kentucky, functioning
as a minimum-security facility for inmates nearing parole.23
Shortly after their introduction, the demand for additional private
prisons increased because of a rapid increase in the prison population
16

See id.
See id.
18
Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional
Facilities: Public versus Private Management, 4 (Economic Growth Center Yale
University,
Working
Paper
No.
863,
2003),
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cpd863.pdf.
19
Austin & Coventry, supra note 5, at 12.
20
Id.
21
See Mulch, supra note 3, at 73.
22
See id.
23
Austin & Coventry, supra note 5, at 12.
17
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nationally. The explosive growth in the total number of privatized
correctional facilities is closely correlated to the aggressive governmental
policies adopted to combat crime beginning in the late 1980s. There are
two primary contributors to the size of a prison population: the number of
offenders that are admitted to prison and the duration of their sentences.24
Between 1988 and 2012, the number of annual federal prison admissions
nearly tripled, increasing from 19,232 to 56,952.25 Concurrently, the
average time served by released federal offenders doubled from 17.9 to
37.5 months.26 In no other category of crime was this exponential increase
more visible than in drug offense, in which the population of incarcerated
drug offenders increased from 15,000 to nearly 100,000 between 1988 and
2012.27
Predictably, this increase in both the volume of offenders admitted as
well as the length of their prison sentences, resulted in the exponential
growth of the federal prison population, increasing from 49,928 in 1988 to
217,815 in 2012, a 336 percent increase.28 This upward trend in prison
population was observed in both state and federal correctional facilities,
          
number of federal and state inmates increased approximately 74 percent
between 1979 and 1986.29 From 1970 to 2007, the aggregate prison
population increased from 196,000 to 1.5 million, representing an increase
of nearly 800 percent.30 The tougher sentencing guidelines and increased
policing was accredited to the growing angst nationally surrounding
perceived increases in violent crime, as well as the increased militarization
of the criminal justice system to combat social ills, as evidenced by
     
The motivation for sentencing reform has historically been attributed
to the mood of the country on crime and punishment, vacillating between
judicial autonomy and discretionary sentencing to proscribed sentencing

24

The Pew Charitable Trusts, Prison Time Surges for Federal Inmates, 2, (Nov. 2015),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2015/11/prison_time_surges_for_federal_inmates.pdf.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See id.
29
See Gary Hunter & Peter Wagner, Prisons, Politics, and the Census, in PRISON
PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION, 80, 81 (Tara Herivel &
Paul Wright eds., 2007).
30
See JFA Institute, Unlocking America, Why and How to Reduce Americas Prison
Population
1,
1
(2007),
https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Resources/Ref/200711_UnlockingAmerica.pdf.; Mulch, supra note 3, at 73.
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intended to create parity in punishment.31 The 1980s and 1990s was replete
                
requirements and release policies to become more restrictive.32 In the early
1970s, states typically allowed discretionary release of offenders by parole
boards, who would review inmate behavior and participation in
educational and work programs.33 While allowing an individualized
review of inmate sentences provided a mechanism to control prison
populations, such discretion drew widespread criticism because of the
resultant parity in sentencing.34 As discretionary sentences continued to
draw public criticism, national concerns with the crime rate increase
translated into states developing sentencing guidelines, enacting
mandatory minimums sentences and other measures intended to both
provide uniformity in sentencing, while also increasing the severity of
those sentences.35
Not surprisingly, these new sentencing guidelines and limits on
judicial discretion led to prison crowding in state correctional facilities,
necessitating an infusion of federal subsidies.36 In response, Congress
appropriated funding in the form of incentive grants to build or expand
correctional facilities through the Violent Offender Incarceration and
Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants Program in the 1994 Crime Act.37
To qualify for these grants, states were required to adopt truth-insentencing laws which mandated that individuals convicted of a Part 1
violent crimes were obligated to serve a minimum of 85% of their prison
sentence.38 The incentive proved incredibly successful, with thirty-two
states and the District of Columbia adopting laws meeting the Federal 85%
truth-in-sentencing requirement.39 Ironically, measures taken to assure
parity in criminal punishment and sentencing substantially increased the
prison population, creating the framework for the proliferation of private
prisons.

31

PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEPT OF JUST., TRUTH IN
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 2 (1999).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796.
38
See id.
39
See U.S. DEPT OF JUST., supra note 31, at 3.
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C. Utility of Private Prisons
The exponential growth in aggregate prison population has resulted in
substantial increases in government spending on corrections both locally
and federally, while also resulting in prison overcrowding and unsafe
conditions. Exacerbating this demand for alternative methods of
incarceration, are mandates by the federal courts for states to employ
corrective measures to alleviate the overcrowding in its prisons.40 In 1991,
federal courts found that overcrowding in prisons in forty states violated
constitutional standards.41 In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States
contemplated the issue of prison overcrowding in Brown v. Plata and
affirmed the di               
system reduce its prison capacity to 137.5% of its design capacity within
two years.42 Judicial mandate to alleviate prison overcrowding, directly
attributable to tougher sentencing laws, has compelled states to seek
immediately available alternative solutions to state operated facilities, for
which contracts with private prisons presented as a viable solution.
Furthermore, as inmate populations increased, so did the government
expenditures on incarceration, burdening state and federal budgets.
Therefore, governmental agencies looked to the private sector to
incorporate efficiencies and cost-cutting strategies that it employs to
increase profit margins, as a strategy to decrease overall governmental
expenditures on incarceration.43 Federal prison spending increased 595
percent from 1980 to 2013, from $970 million to more than $6.7 billion,
accounting for inflation.44 In fact, the federal budget for prisons in 2013
equaled the federal budget of the entire U.S. Justice Department in 1980.45
Contracting with private prison corporations also allowed government
agencies to avoid cumbersome procurement and obligation bonds to
finance the construction of new prison facilities.46 Rather than construct
and operate the prisons, governments contract with private prison
operators at a fixed per diem amount (presumably lower than what would
have been expended in the alternative) to house and provide basic services
to the inmates. Prison privatization was perceived, and propagated, as a
40

See Douglas C. McDonald, Private Penal Institutions, 16 CRIME & JUST. 361, 393
(1992).
41
Kade A. Rhodes, Locked Out of Business: A Look at the Future of the Private Prison
Industry, 18 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 224, 22829 (2018).
42
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 50910, 546 (2011).
43
See Lisa Lambert, States Seek to Escape Rising Prison Costs, REUTERS (May 20,
2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-states-prisons/states-seek-to-escape-risingprison-costs-idUSTRE74J3S920110520.
44
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 24.
45
Id.
46
See McDonald, supra note 40, at 393-94.
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mutually beneficial solution to the financial strain of mass incarceration;
governments were no longer burdened with the cumbersome management
of correctional institutions, and private prisons could eliminate the
bureaucratic inefficiencies to create a profitable enterprise.

D. Private Prison Viability Inextricably Bound to Political Climate
Because the private prison business model is largely predicated on
procuring government contracts to build and manage correctional
facilities, their financial viability is inextricably bound to the political and
legislative sentiment towards criminal justice broadly and privatization
more specifically. Private prison corporations are acutely aware of the
financial risk that policies to reducing the prison population pose to their
profitability and advise their investors accordingly.47 Correctional
Corporation of America, in its 2010 Annual Report to the Security and
Exchange Commission (SEC) cautioned investors:
Our ability to secure new contracts to develop and manage
correctional and detention facilities depends on my
factors outside our control. Our growth is generally
dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to
develop and manage new correctional and detention
facilities. This possible growth depends on a number of
factors we cannot control, including crime rats and
sentencing patterns in various jurisdictions and
acceptance of privatization. The demand for our facilities
and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation
of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole
standards and sentencing practices or through the
decriminalization of certain activities that are currently
proscribed by our criminal laws. For instance, any
changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances
or illegal immigration could affect the number of persons
arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially
reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them.
Legislation has been proposed in numerous jurisdictions
that could lower minimum sentences for some nonviolent crimes and make more inmates eligible for early
release based on good behavior. Also, sentencing
alternatives under consideration could put some offenders
on probation with electronic monitoring who would
47

See JUST. POLY INST., GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF
PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES 29 (2011).
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otherwise be incarcerated. Similarly, reductions in crime
rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime
could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and
sentences requiring incarceration in correctional
facilities.48
            
outside of its control, such as the decriminalization of substance abuse or
changes to illegal immigration policies, is illustrative of the dependence
of private prison corporations on favorable criminal justice policies and
lends credence to theories of political maneuvering to ensure those
policies. The GEO Group articulated a similar vulnerability to variance in
public or legislative sentiment towards government utilization of publicprivate partnerships for correctional facilities in its 2019 second-quarter
SEC filing:
Any report prepared by or requested by a governmental agency or
public official, investigation or inquiry, public statement by any
governmental agency or public official, policy or legislative change, or
other similar occurrence or action, that seeks to, or purports to, prohibit,
eliminate, or otherwise restrict or limit in any way, the federal
          
private operators of these facilities and centers, could adversely impact our
ability to maintain or renew existing contracts or to obtain new contracts.49
Private prison operators recognize that their business models are
susceptible not only to fluctuations in the prison populations but are
inherently aware that their businesses are intimately bound to the
government policies that govern incarceration and utilization of publicprivate partnerships. Because the long-term viability of private prisons is
dependent on strong, positive relationships with government officials,
significant investments in political lobbying and governmental relations is
justifiably considered a necessary business expenditure.
Investors are similarly cognizant of the considerable influence that
public policy and governmental agencies have on the fiscal viability of
private prison operators. This was evidenced by the market response to the
August 2016 announcement by the U.S. Department of Justice that it
would stop contracting with private prisons to operate federal prisons.
After the announcement, the C     

48

Corr. Corp. of Am., 2010 Annual Report (Form 10-K), 19-20 (Dec. 31, 2010)
(emphasis added).
49
GEO Group Inc., 2019 Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 12, 2020).
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price decreased by fifty percent.50 In response, the company adopted a
more expansive name, CoreCivic, to demonstrate that its focus was not
limited to criminal corrections, rather the business provided a wider array
of public-private solutions.51        !
              !   
which its stock price rose by 40 percent.52 Similarly, GEO experienced a
30 percent increase in stock valuation after the 2016 presidential
election.53
Recognizing the immediate threat that this policy posed to their
business, GEO Group contributed a total of $200,000 to support the
election of Donald Trump, with the largest contribution recorded on the
day after t  !     
of private prisons.54 In 2017, the stock prices for both CoreCivic and GEO
Group more than doubled after U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions
announced that it would continue contracting with private prisons.55
Because government action and legislative policy are highly determinative
of their financial viability and long-term sustainability, it stands to reason
that these companies would benefit from maintaining relationships and
advocating for policies that would promote their business interests. David
Shicor, a prominent author in opposition of prison privatization opined,
             
provision of perks to politicians (as industrial and business corporations
do), corporations are likely to continue to support and even accelerate
incarceration-oriented legislation and policies by which more people will
            56 The drastic
change in stock valuation in response to the Obama Department of Justice
announcement as compared to after the election of Donald Trump is
illustrative of the inextricable nature of private prisons and government
policy, thus incentivizing fir             
candidates.

50
Matt Stroud, Private Prisons Get a Boost from Trump, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Nov. 18, 2016); see KARA GOTSCH & VINAY BASTI, THE SENT!G PROJECT, CAPITALIZING
ON MASS INCARCERATION: U.S. GROWTH IN PRIVATE PRISONS 12 (2018).
51
See Gotsch & Basti, supra note 50, at 12.
52
See Stroud, supra note 50.
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
See Gotsch & Basti, supra note 50, at 12.
56
DAVID SCHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 236
(1995).
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PART II: PRIVATE PRISON CORPORATION PROFILES: POLITICAL
LOBBYING AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
The rate of growth of inmates housed in private prisons far exceeds
the overall rate of growth in national incarceration rates.57 Between 1990
and 2009, the number of people incarcerated in for-profit prisons grew
more than 1,600%, increasing from approximately 7,000 to 129,000
inmates.58 Private prisons operating in the United States housed 121,718
people in 2017, representing 8.2% of the aggregate state and federal prison
population.59 The Federal Bureau of Prisons maintains the highest prison
population managed by private prison contractors, in 2017 the aggregate
population in federal custody managed by private contractorsincluding
those in prisons, half-way houses and home confinementtotaled
27,569.60 There is significant variance in state utilization of private
correctional facilities.61 For instance, while New Mexico Department of
Corrections reports that 53% of its prison population is in private facilities,
whereas there are twenty-two states who do not contract with private
prisons. 62 The three largest and most prominent private prison operators
are, CoreCivic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America), GEO
Group, and Management and Training Corporation.63

A. CoreCivic
One of the most established private prison corporations is CoreCivic,
who previously operated as Corrections Corporation of America. The
company website suggests that the principle motivation for its formation
was the federal judicial mandate that states prison overcrowding and
similar practices were unconstitutional.64 CoreCivic, a publicly-traded
real estate investment trust (REIT) on the New York Stock Exchange, is
      owner of partnership correctional, detention, and
         65 In 2018, the company posted an annual

57

See AM. C.L. UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS
INCARCERATION 5 (2011).
58
Id.
59
THE SENTG PROJECT, FACT SHEET: PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2019).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See id.
64
Tom Beasley, A New Industry Emerges to Meet a Very Real Need, CORECIVIC,
http://www.corecivic.com/about/history (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
65
About CoreCivic, CORECIVIC, https://www.corecivic.com/about (last visited Feb. 20,
2020).
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revenue of $1.8 billion, netting $520 million gross profit.66 Over half of
           ctional
contracts.67 In addition to the operational management of its correctional
facilities, CoreCivic invests in political and government relations to
                   
 68
CoreCivic maintains a clearly articulated and robust policy governing
its political contributions and lobbying activities, and asserts that
transparency is critical to its relationship with government partners,
taxpayers and shareholders.69 Direct governance of the c
political and government relations activities and compliance is provided
by the Risk Committee of the Board of Directors.70 The company sponsors
a political action committee, bearing its name, that makes contributions to
federal candidates and candidates in jurisdictions which corporate
contributions are not permitted.71 In 2018 CoreCivic, through its corporate
and political action committee, contributed $1,186,390.46 in political
contributions to candidates, political parties, and committees.72 Since
1995, CoreCivic has contributed $5,749,467.00 to 1,533 state-level
candidates nationwide.73 Interestingly, while there was a slight advantage
in contributions made to Republican candidates (62%) as compared to
Democratic candidates (33%), contributions tended to be directed to
incumbents (79%) and ultimately the winning candidate (86 percent).74 In
2018, CoreCivic expended $1.43 million in payments and fees to support
direct lobbying at the Federal, state and local levels, of which $617,797
was attributable to Federal direct lobbying. 75

66

CoreCivic,
Inc.
(CXW
US
Equity),
BLOOMBERG
LAW,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/company/financials/CXW%20US%20Equity/Overview
(last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
67
CORECIVIC INC, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (Jul. 19, 2019),
https://investigate.afsc.org/company/corecivic#:~:text=In%202018%2C%20CoreCivic%
20reported%20%241.83,Bureau%20of%20Prisons%20(BOP).
68
Political & Lobbying Activity, CORECIVIC, http://ir.corecivic.com/corporategovernance/political-lobbying-activity (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
69
See generally Political Activity and Lobbying Report 2018, CORECIVIC, 1,
http://ir.corecivic.com/static-files/e621a712-a923-43b7-8533-0fef1c04cab0 (last visited
Nov. 8, 2019).
70
Id. at 2.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 3.
73
CoreCivic FKA Corrections Corp of America / CCA, NATL INST. ON MONEY IN POL.:
FOLLOWTHEMONEY, https://www.followthemoney.org/entity-details?eid=695 (last visited
Jan. 16, 2020).
74
Id.
75
CORECIVIC, supra note 69, at 7.
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Although the company maintains robust government relations
activities, the company has a longstanding policy which prohibits lobbying
'    #!  
durat   "!)      (76 Rather, the
company asserts that its government relations activities are principally
!' "! %$! "   % 
the construction, operation and leasing of privately owned or managed
          %  (77 Despite
&"    %  ")
historical giving patterns do not exhibit the trends one would expect,
namely, giving to a particular party or committee members responsible for
crafting legislation dealing #   !     ")
political strategy seems to favor incumbent candidates and those with the
greatest probability of victory.
Surprisingly, the company has committed sizeable government
relations resources and expertise to advocate for policies that would
appear to be antithetical to their business-model, in particular policies to
! " ! '-the-$(   " 
 "!)# %" !
and liabilities for companies looking to hire former inmates; increased
funding for reentry programming; and, social impact bond pilot programs
which tie contractor performance measures and payment to positive
outcomes for participants.78 On first-glance, these recidivism-reducing
policies would appear to be adverse to its business interests, which is
predicated on higher volume and duration of incarceration, however
CoreCivic maintains that successful reentry, and thus reduced recidivism,
to be fundamental to its mission as a corporation.79

B. The GEO Group, Inc.
The second largest private prison corporation is The GEO Group Inc.
'
(#  %    ! 
operates in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, is publicly
traded real estate investment trust on the New York Stock Exchange.80 In
its corporate mission statement, GEO states that it seeks to develop
'" "!-private partnerships with government agencies around
76

Id. at 2.
Id.
78
See
generally
Reentry
Policies,
CORECIVIC,
http://www.corecivic.com/reentrypolicies (last visited Nov. 8, 2019).
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The GEO Group Inc. (GEO U.S. Equity),
BLOOMBERG LAW,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/company/ticker/GEO%20US%20Equity (last visited
Nov. 8, 2019).
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the globe that deliver high quality, correctional, community reentry, and
electronic monitoring services . . 81 GEO employs 22,000 globally and
reported an annual revenue of $2.3 billion dollars in 2018 derived from its
fully diversified array of correctional services.82 As a company whose
business is predicated on public-private partnerships, GEO cultivates
relationships with government agencies in the United States and
globally.83
                    
monitored by its legal department and Board of Directors, to ensure that
all activity is in accord with state and federal law.84 GEO also sponsors a
non-partisan political action committee, funded exclusively by voluntary
employee contributions and makes contributions to federal candidates and
state candidates in those in jurisdictions in which they are permitted.85 In
2018, between its corporate donations and its political action committee,
GEO donated $3,324,690 to individual candidates, parties and
committees, at the federal, state and local levels. Aggregating the political
contributions of GEO Group, which includes Cornell Companies and
Correctional Services Corp. which were acquired by GEO, the company
has contributed $11,351,381.00 to 1,128 candidates seeking state office.86
As was with CoreCivic, GEO prioritizes campaign contributions to
incumbents (76 percent) and eventual winners (76 percent), as compared
to exhibiting a party allegiance; giving to Republican candidates sixtyseven percent of the time and Democratic candidates twenty-four percent
of the time.87 Additionally, GEO expended an aggregate amount of $4.3
million to consultant government relations professionals involved in direct
lobbying at the federal, state and local levels.88 Notably, one of the lobbyist
employed by the GEO Group in 2019 is Pam Biondi, who served as the
Florida Attorney General from 2011 to 2019.89
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See Who We Are, GEO GROUP, https://www.geogroup.com/who_we_are (last
visited Apr. 29, 2021).
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See generally The GEO Group, Inc. Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 31, 2019).
83
Political Activity and Lobbying Report 2018, THE GEO GROUP, 1,
https://www.geogroup.com/Portals/0/SR/Political%20Engagement/Political_Activity_an
d_Lobbying_Report_2018.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2019).
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Id.
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See Client Profile: GEO Group, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/federallobbying/clients/lobbyists?cycle=2019&id=D000022003 (last Visited Jan. 16, 2020);
see also Former Florida Attorney General Pam Biondi Joins Ballard Partners, FLORIDA
TREND (Jan, 22, 2019), https://www.floridatrend.com/article/26199/former-floridaattorney-general-pam-bondi-joins-ballard-partners.
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GEO asserts that its engagement in legislative and regulatory
proceedings is imperative to promoting the benefits of public-private
partnerships and are focused on government actions that directly impact
public-private partnerships in its service areas.90 The company insists that
its political contributions and lobby expenditures do not seek to influence
criminal justice or immigration policies, nor does GEO lobby for or
"$!
 &         
#   %91  "   "   &
political contributions reveals that its giving patterns are far more
indiscriminate than what was evidenced by the sizeable contribution to the
Trump administration immediately following the Department of Justice
decision to no longer contract with private prisons to operate federal
        !  &
political activity, and policies and legislation that would increase the
volume or duration of imprisonment.

C. Management & Training Corporation
Of the three largest private prison contractors, Management &
  $
%   "  "  92
Maintaining sixty-two contracts in twenty-one states and internationally,
MTC employs 8,446 people globally.93 Because MTC privatized in 2016,
the last available financial statement indicates that its total revenue in 2015
was $753 million, yielding a net profit of $30 million.94 MTC employs a
political action committee, the majority of whose donors are senior
executives of MTC or their spouses.95 In 2018, its political action
committee contributed $111,950 to federal candidates; sixty-seven percent
of which were to Republican candidates.96

90

See Political Activity and Lobbying Report 2018, supra note 83.
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D. Day 1 Alliance
To combat the growing criticism of prison privatization, the three
aforementioned companies formed a trade group called the Day 1
Alliance, which is designed to redefine the public perception of the
industry.97 The description of the alliance indicates that its name affirms
the responsibility of private prison contractors to provide humane and
respectful treatment of incarcerated and detained individuals for the
entirety of the moment they enter into their care.98 Among the issues that
the Day 1 Alliance champions are policies aimed at reducing recidivism,
including the passage of the First Step Act.99

PART III: ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
     

  

Despite the sizeable investments made to support traditional political
lobbying and campaign contributions, the greatest dividends for private
prison corporations appear to derive from their membership and
participation in a relatively unknown public policy non-profit
organization, the American Legislative Exchange Council.100 ALEC is a
voluntary, nonpartisan membership organization of state legislators
committed to espousing the principles of limited government, free markets
and federalism.101 Nearly one-     
stakeholders are members of ALEC, collectively representing more than
60 million Americans.102 These elected officials work collaboratively with
    -membership base, corporations and private sector
interest groups, to propose policy recommendations in a multitude of
areas.103 Private sector representatives work with legislative members to
draft model legislation, bills that serve as templates for actual legislation
97

Daniel Lippman, Meet the K Street types giving to the Democratic candidates,
POLITICO INFLUENCE (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politicoinfluence/2019/10/25/meet-the-k-street-types-giving-to-the-democratic-candidates781560.
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2019).
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Issues, DAY ONE ALLIANCE, https://day1alliance.org/issues/ (last visited Apr. 27,
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100
See JUST. POLY INST., supra note 47, at 29.
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https://www.alec.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
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Allison Boldt, Rhetoric v. Reality: ALECs Disguise as a Nonprofit Despite Its
Extensive Lobbying, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 35, 36 (2012).
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  $ 104 On average, ALEC
drafts approximately 1,000 pieces model acts every year, which are
  # $ !embers; approximately 20 percent of
which are enacted as law.105 Thousands of ALEC model acts have been
adopted by state legislatures and enacted nationwide, and have been the
basis for a number of highly controversial laws. One such law that has
been the source of widespread public animus is the Stand Your Ground
law, which gained national notoriety because of its association with the
senseless murder of Trayvon Martin.106
  ! $ 
Forces, comprised of both private sector and legislative members.107 Task
!     $ 
       "   $    
jurisdiction.108 To be adopted, an ALEC model act must be approved by
its Governing Board and have majority support from legislative Task
Force members, as well as its private sector members, who are polled
separately.109 This collaborative drafting process, coupled with the
required consensus between its legislative and private sector members,
provides private sector members unfettered access to draft legislation that
promotes their business interests.110
Until their departure in 2010, two notable private sector members and
supporting contributors of ALEC were Corrections Corporation of
America and GEO, paying between $7,000 and $25,000 in annual
membership.111 CCA maintained a seat, and at times co-chaired, the Public
Safety Task Force (formerly the Criminal Justice and Homeland Security
Task Force), which developed model legislation with respect to criminal
justice and national security.112 Over the span of two decades, CCA was
actively involved in the development of more than 85 model bills and
resolutions that mandated tougher criminal sentencing, increased
immigration enforcement and facilitated the privatization of prisons.113 In
the mid-   $ $     !
served as the private sector chair of the task force that drafted and adopted
model legislation that would increase both the volume and duration of
104
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incarceration.114 Contemporaneously, ALEC drafted model bills which
established mandatory minimums, three strikes laws (mandating 25 years
$ "#"" $##+$"%$-in-#$,"!%"
inmates to serve a majority of their sentence without the possibility of
parole), which served as the foundation for the exponential growth in
incarceration. 115 In its 1995 Model Legislation Scorecard, the ALEC
" %#$# "#$$#+ -#"%$$cing Act and
"$"#%-" %$$&$#$$&##% "$
by the Task Force. At least one of these model bills has been enacted in
$#$$#$%$"),116 In an article entitled Getting Tough
Works: Old Strategies Are the Weapons in the New War on Crime, a
"" # ""$"#$$+"%$-in-sentencing, based on
ALEC model bill, require inmates to serve 80 to 90 percent of their
#$#"" ",117 Membership in ALEC
allowed private prison corporations to circumvent the traditional
legislative process by working collaboratively to author favorable model
legislation without the burden of cumbersome public disclosure laws that
govern the legislative process.
Not only did ALEC model legislation serve as the catalyst for the
( $"'$"-# "#  %$$" 
#$ $ +"&$ ""$ $# $, ' #$$# $
contract with private prison operators.118 The model act allo'"+)
unit of government to contract with the private sector to perform services
%""$) "& )  ""$# ),119 In fact, in one session
"# "&$*$ '# $ # $ "  ##% )  -#
Criminal Justice Task Force.120 Membership in ALEC not only afforded
private prison corporations the opportunity to draft legislation that led to
the explosive growth in the domestic prison population, but the very laws
that allowed for their existence are attributable to their membership in this
organization.121
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See JUST. POL-Y INST., supra note 47, at 29.
116
BRIGETTE SARABI & EDWIN BENDER, THE PRISON PAYOFF: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN
THE INCARCERATION BOOM 4 (2000) (quoting ALEC 1995 Model Legislation Scorecard,
July 1995).
117
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B. Single Issue Lobbies
While the lobbying efforts of private prison corporations have elicited
the greatest public angst because of the perceived moral abhorrence for
private entities profiting from mass incarcerations, some theorists posit
that single issue lobbies, like the public-sector corrections unions, are
more responsible for the enactment of tough-on-crime legislation.122 For
instance, the California Correctional Peace Officers Association
" #  and most active public sector single issue
lobbies, has made significant financial contributions to tough-on-crime
    $123 The CCPOA was actively
              $ strikes law.124 Shortly thereafter, the association began advocating for the
passage of a 10-20-life set of mandatory minimum penalties for crimes
committed with firearms.125 Theorists opine that because single-issue
lobbies are cause-driven and are dependent on a cause for their existence,
achievement of one objective leads cause organizers to quickly identify
      
   !  $
immediate support of strict sentencing for gun laws, shortly after
successful passage of the three-strikes laws. Similar to private prison
corporations single issue advocacy groups, like the public-sector
correctional unions, derive a pecuniary benefit from mass incarceration,
except their dividends are in the form of more correctional jobs and thus
increased union membership, as compared to distributed profits.126

C. Nefarious Business Development Strategies
In addition to political advocacy, there are concerns that private prison
operators employee nefarious business development strategies to fill
vacancies in their facilities.127 An example of such troubling behavior
gained national attention in February 2011, when a federal jury convicted
Pennsylvania Judge Mark Ciavarella of racketeering, money laundering,
and conspiracy in what prosecuto   "  #  128
Ciavarella was convicted of accepting nearly one million dollars from
developers of a private juvenile facility in Pennsylvania in exchange for
giving excessive sentences juveniles to excessive sentences in the private
122

Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2008).
123
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facilities.129 #%!#( " "!
22% of juvenile detentions in Pennsylvania, despite Luzerne County
"!%  %#( "!130 In one incident,
Judge Ciavarella purportedly based a ju#(  !    &!
"     "!   "! $$'131 The
unscrupulous business dealings casted such uncertainty about the merit of
#(  "  !! ! " "!   %#   
 "#    $    !! &   "! !
have any confidence that Ciavarella decided any Luzerne County juvenile
case fairly and impartially while he labored under the specter of his self! ! $!!! '132 "#( ! $
particularly egregious and likely not widespread, nevertheless there is
concern that the occupancy-driven business model of private prisons
engenders perverse incentive to engage in nefarious activities in order to
fill vacancies.

PART IV: THREATS TO PRIVATE PRISON BUSINESS VIABILITY
Despite the legislative victories which served as the foundation for
mass incarceration and established the basis for the proliferation of private
prisons, as well as the restored confidence following the election of
Donald Trump, these corporations are experiencing an existential threat
from an unexpected source, public opinion.133 Ironically, the catalyst for
the widespread scrutiny and public outcry against private prisons was the
" !!( " #!! ! !# %
separation immigration policy.134 De ! ! "  !!( 
embrace of prison privatization, constituents are not only using their
democratic influence to pressure local elected officials to take action
against private prisons, they have leveraged their influence as consumers
to pressure banks and other financial institutions to reevaluate their
business dealings with the industry.135
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A. State Bans of Private Prisons
Public frustration with the privatization of prisons, coupled with the
growing percentage of state expenditures on incarceration have caused
state legislatures to reevaluate the utility of private prisons.136 There are a
total of 22 states, governed by both Republican and Democratic
administrations, that do not contract with for-profit companies to operate
correctional facilities.137 Additionally, there have been a number of state
legislatures that have passed legislation banning the use of private prisons
in their states.138 Nevada passed such a law, prohibiting the use of private
prions to operate state and local correctional facilities after June 30, 2022,
and placed more stringent compliance standards for private prison
operators.139 A month after the passage of the Nevada bill, Illinois, which
banned for-profit prisons in 1990, expanded that law to include privately
operated immigration detention centers.140
Subsequently, California passed a bill in October 2019 that would
seemingly end the use of for-profit prisons and detention centers in the
state.141 The legislation establishes that over four years, the state will close
three private prisons that house 1,400 inmates and will stop operating four
private detention facilities holding 4,000 individuals in 2020.142 There are,
however, concerns that the porous bill language which provides an
                
               ued use of private
prisons.143 There is also a provision in the law that would not prohibit the
department of corrections from renewing or extending a contract to house
inmates to comply with a court-ordered population cap.144 Despite the
perceived loopholes, private prison corporations view this legislation as an
assault on their viability and have filed a lawsuit in federal court to
challenge the ban.145
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The lawsuit, filed by GEO Group ten days after federal officials signed
contracts with GEO and two other       
private immigrant detention center for an estimated $6.5 billion dollars,
asserts that the California legislation is an attempt to subvert the authority
of the federal government and is thus unconstitutional. 146 GEO alleges that
the legislation violates the Supremacy Clause by imposing a state policy
which interferes with enactment of Federal immigration law.147 These new
contracts would double the number of immigrant detention beds in
California to 7,200.148 Furthermore, GEO manages two federal prisons in
the state with a combined capacity of 1,237 beds for federal inmates.149
GEO asserts that if the legislation results in the closing of its facilities in
California it would lose an average of $250 million dollars in revenue per
year for fifteen years, as well as an additional $300 million invested in
acquiring and retrofitting the buildings.150
A month after GEO filed suit, the Trump administration filed a similar
lawsuit in federal court seeking injunctive relief of Califo  
Bill 32.151 The complaint also asserts that legislation violates the
Supremacy Clause by dictating how federal inmates and immigration
detainees can be housed.152 In the complaint, the Trump administration
asserts that there are about 3,200 federal inmates in California in private
detention facilities between the U.S. Marshals Service and the Bureau of
Prisons, in addition to nearly 5,000 Immigration and Customs
Enforcement detainees in private facilities.153 The complaint alleges that
compliance with AB 32, which would require transporting inmates and
detainees out of state, would adversely impact the U.S. Marshals operation
           154 Nevertheless, the
complaint acknowledges that California is free to regulate its state prisons
and jails as it sees fit, and thus only challenges the applicability of the
legislation to federal action.155
Despite the expansive loopholes included in the bill language, as well
as the pending legislation challenging its constitutionality, the California
146
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#!"!""*!!#!"" !#"!#!" "$
the threat posed to the economic viability of private prison corporations
by local elected officials responding to pressure from their constituents.156
This vulnerability was articulated by an investment analyst who opined
""( $ "$"& " !""!##&!"
to effectively regulate the sector, --or, as many would argue, to eliminate
private prisons entirely, given their problematic incentive to encourage the
 '"$# #"!)157 Although state legislative
action prohibiting the privatization of incarceration presents an existential
threat through demand-side pressures, public animus has threatened
 $"  !   "!* !! " " % !  " " " 
operational management.

B. Divestment by Pension Plans
Citing records of human rights violations, as well as the volatility of
private prison corporations subject to political influence, several pensions
have chosen to divest from private prison corporations.158 Trustees for
%   "&*! $ !! $"  &   "  "  !"
retirement fund in the U.S. to divest assets, approximately $48 million in
stock and bonds from GEO Group Inc., CoreCivic Inc. and G4s Plc.159 The
decision to divest was also motivated by lawsuits and reports of abuse,
wrongful deaths, and increased violence resulting from insufficient
staffing in private facilities, which the pension managers cited as a longterm financial threat to investors. 160 In an editorial published in the New
York Times and written by New York City Comptroller, Scott Stringer, he
encourages other pension funds to divest from private prison corporations
!"" (! #! $  # & #"& "  !#
156
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investments . . . .That means constantly evaluating the long-term viability
   "      !'   . . . Private
       ' !  ! $'  
!&161 The cited motivation to divest, not
because of the moral abhorrence of profiting from mass incarceration and
immigrant detention, rather a fiduciary obligation to its investors, signals
that investors perceive a business model that is predicated on fractious
government contracts are too uncertain to maintain investments.
    "  $  #   $ $'
Retirement System, the New York State Common Retirement System and
      '
Pension Fund and the Califo   '    $ "
divested their direct stock holdings of private prison corporations.162 In
August 2018, the New Jersey Pension Fund divested $1.3 million in stock
         % ! "  "   "# 
investment merits, including consideration of environmental, social and
governance issues, and consistent with its fiduciary responsibility elected
   ! $&163 Pension fund managers, recognizing a fiduciary
responsibility to their investors, have concluded that the political volatility
of prison privatization coupled with litigation alleging inhumane treatment
of inmates, have rendered investments in private prison operators
imprudent.164 Divestment by pension funds pose a grave threat to the longterm financial viability of publicly-traded prison corporations, who are
dependent on stock offerings as a method of accessing capital to maintain
its business operations.

C. Commercial Bank Financing
While the decision by pension funds to divest their stock holdings in
private prison corporations will likely lead to decreases in stock valuation,
perhaps the gravest threat to private prisons is the recent decision by
commercial lenders to terminate their relationship with private prison
corporations.165 The majority of publicly recognized commercial lenders
have committed to not renewing an estimated $2.4 billion in credit lines
and term loans to GEO Group and CoreCivic once their current facilities
expire.166 In its decision to end its business relationships with private
161
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prisons, Bank of America cited both legal and policy concerns, as well as
employee and stakeholder apprehensions regarding its financing of private
prison operators.167 Similarly, PNC Bank announced that it would cease
business relationships with private prison operators in response to a
petition circulated from the Families Belong Together coalition of over
250 groups, representing over 11 million individuals.168 The decision to no
longer provide financing is acutely detrimental to private prison
corporations, who rely on the capital to sustain their operational
management.169
GEO Group and CoreCivic operate as Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs), meaning that most of their assets and income are derived from
real estate investments.170 In exchange for favorable tax benefits, REITs
are required to distribute at least 90 percent of taxable income as dividends
to shareholders.171 The one year returns to shareholders for both GEO
Group and CoreCivic are down nearly 30%, resulting in their designation
as underperforming relative to other REITs.172 This mandated payout of
dividends leaves the companies with little cash on hand to cover day-today operations, such as salaries and other administrative costs and
therefore are reliant on revolving credit from commercial banks to run
their operations.173 Although the REIT business model yields favorable tax
benefits and results in higher shareholder dividends, without access to
capital from financial institutions the long-term business viability of
private prisons is uncertain save for adoption of an alternative business
model which maintains a higher percentage of capital gains.
GEO Group articulated the threat posed to its long-term viability if
additional financial institutions cease financing in its most recent SEC
filing:
[S]everal financial institutions, including some of our
lenders, have recently announced that they will not be
https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/09/30/geo-group-runs-out-of-banks-as100-of-banking-partners-say-no-to-the-private-prison-sector/.
167
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renewing existing agreements or entering into new
agreements with companies that operate such facilities
and centers pursuant to public-private partnerships. Some
of these same institutions have ceased their equity analyst
coverage of our company. While we believe we will
continue to have access to the capital and debt markets
on a cost-effective basis to support the growth and
expansion of our high-quality services, if other financial
institutions or third parties that currently provide us with
financing or that we do business with decide in the future
to cease providing us with financing or doing business
with us, such determinations could have a material
adverse effect on our business, financial condition and
results of operations. Increased resistance to the use of
public-private partnerships for our facilities and centers in
any of the markets in which we operate, as a result of these
or other factors, could have a material adverse effect on
our nosiness, financial condition, results of operations and
the market price of our securities.174
Despite its articulated confidence that it will maintain access to capital
and debt markets, the prospect of securing additional financing remains
uncertain. In total, the commitments by commercial banks to no longer
provide financing to private prison operators represents 87.4% of all
financing available to both CoreCivic and GEO Group.175 The uncertainty
regarding the ability of private prison corporations to secure financing,
vital to its business operations, has resulted in Fitch Ratings downgrading
      176
In June 2019, the New York State Senate passed Bill S5433, which
prohibits banks chartered in the state from financing private prisons.177 In
a speech introducing the legislation, bill sponsor Senator Benjamin said,
       
their hard-earned savings in a bank . . . expecting that those funds will be
used to finance mass i 178 Senator Benjamin recognizes that
a concerted effort to limit access to capital, coupled with community

174

GEO Group Inc., 2019 2nd Quarter Report on Form 10-K 58 (June 2019) (emphasis
added).
175
See Simon supra note 166.
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See id.
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See Simon, supra note 166.
178
See Simon supra note 166.



120

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:93

pressure to end privatization, are important strategies to combat the use of
private prisons.179
Some speculate that if traditional lenders are no longer available, nonbank lenders, such as private equity investors or hedge fund investors, will
provide the financing needed to operate.180 While this infusion of capital
will be essential to sustain its business operations under the REIT business
model, these funding sources are likely to charge higher interest rates
because of the elevated risk of the loans and diminish profitability.181
Because private prison corporations rely on financing from shareholders
and commercial lenders to sustain their business operations, the decision
by pension funds and private banks to terminate business relationships
pose the most immediate, and gravest, threat to the vitality of private
prisons.182

PART V: CONCLUSION
Like hotels, private prisons are predicated on a business model that
requires maximum occupancy to assure profitability. However, unlike
hotels, whose occupancy is subject to a myriad of externalities, private
prison occupancy is a function of the domestic prison population and
government sentiment towards public-private partnerships for
incarceration.
Because their business viability is predicated on high rates of
incarceration and favorable relationships with state and federal
government representatives, one would presume that private prison
corporations would have a perverse incentivize to advocate for the
enactment of laws that increase the number of inmates and the duration of
their sentences. While private prison operators do maintain robust political
advocacy and lobbying efforts; their success, beginning in the 1980s,
appears to be less attributable to their traditional lobbying efforts and more
likely the result of another form of advocacy, the collaborative drafting of
policy.
         
      d
frameworks responsible for the explosive in the prison population between
the 1980s and 1990s, were drafted collaboratively as model legislation in
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). It was membership
in ALEC that afforded the Correctional Corporations of America (CCA)
and GEO Group, Inc. the opportunity to work collaboratively with state
179
180
181
182
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legislatures nationwide to develop model legislation that would serve as
the basis for truth-in-sentencing and three strikes laws and resulted in the
explosive growth of prison populations. Both CoreCivic and GEO Group
are correct when they assert that they do not actively lobby for legislation
that increases the amount and duration of incarceration, because rather
than lobby for the legislation, membership in ALEC allows for a far more
effective method, they draft it.
While private prison operators have enjoyed unprecedented growth
and proven to be incredibly profitable, recent events, beginning with the
  
              vate prisons for
federal inmates, have demonstrated their vulnerability to political and
public sentiment. Widespread consternation with the privatization of
prisons has resulted in increased democratic and consumer pressure to
sever relationships with private prison corporations. Recent state
legislative action prohibiting the contracts to private entities for state
correctional facilities reveals the demand-side susceptibility of private
prisons, nevertheless actions by the Trump administration reveal that
demand is malleable and can be supplemented, as evidenced by the
extension of service offerings to include immigration detention. Far more
menacing to the long-term financial viability of private prisons are the
decisions by pension funds and commercial lenders to terminate business
relationships with private prisons corporations. These decisions by
financial institutions demonstrate that they are more responsive to public
dismay than potential profitability. Therefore, if private prison enterprises
want to remain financially viable, they would be better served
concentrating their efforts on improving public sentiment and redefining
the narrative around privatization of prisons, rather than relying solely on
favorable government action to drive demand for their product.



